Assessment of the potential costs and benefits of water trading across northern Australia<br /> by Nikolakis, W. D. & Grafton, R. Q.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment of the potential costs 
and benefits of water trading 
across northern Australia   
  
W. D Nikolakis and R.Q Grafton    
Crawford School of Economics and Government 
The Australian National University 
 
March 2011 
 
 
 
 (Photo courtesy of W. Nikolakis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 Disclaimer 
TRaCK has published the information contained in this publication to assist public 
knowledge and discussion and to help improve the sustainable management of 
Australia’s tropical rivers and coasts. Where technical information has been prepared by 
or contributed by authors external to TRaCK, readers should contact the author(s), and 
conduct their own enquiries, before making use of that information. No person should act 
on the contents of this publication whether as to matters of fact or opinion or other 
content, without first obtaining specific independent professional advice which confirms 
the information contained within this publication. 
 
While all reasonable efforts have been made to ensure that the information in this 
publication is correct, matters covered by the publication are subject to change. Charles 
Darwin University does not assume and hereby disclaims any express or implied liability 
whatsoever to any party for any loss or damage caused by errors or omissions, whether 
these errors or omissions result from negligence, accident or any other cause. 
 
Copyright 
This publication is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, 
research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be 
reproduced, by any process, without written permission from the publisher, Enquiries 
should be made to the publisher, Charles Darwin University, c/- TRaCK, Casuarina 
Campus, Building Red 1 Level 3, Darwin NT 0909. 
 
TRaCK brings together leading tropical river researchers and managers from Charles 
Darwin University, Griffith University, the University of Western Australia, CSIRO, James 
Cook University, the Australian National University, Geoscience Australia, the 
Environmental Research Institute of the Supervising Scientist, the Australian Institute of 
Marine Science, the North Australia Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance, 
and the Governments of Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia. 
 
TRaCK receives major funding for its research through the Australian Government's 
Commonwealth Environment Research Facilities initiative; the Australian Government's 
Raising National Water Standards Program; Land and Water Australia; the Fisheries 
Research and Development Corporation and the Queensland Government's Smart State 
Innovation Fund. 
 
 
W. D Nikolakis and R.Q Grafton (2011). Assessment of the potential costs and benefits 
of water trading across northern Australia. Charles Darwin University, Darwin. 
 
For further information about this publication: 
William Nikolakis, Australian National University 
Email: william.nikolakis@anu.edu.au 
 
Or to find out more about TRaCK 
Visit:  http://www.track.gov.au/  ISBN:  978-1-921576-41-6 
Email:  track@cdu.edu.au  Published by:  Charles Darwin University 
Phone:  08 8946 7444  Printed by : Griffith University       
        
 Contents 
 
Summary ............................................................................................................................. 1 
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................. 5 
Abbreviations...................................................................................................................... 6 
Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 7 
1. Project overview ............................................................................................................. 9 
2. Introduction................................................................................................................... 10 
Aims.............................................................................................................................. 10 
Background................................................................................................................... 10 
3. Institutional setting for water markets .......................................................................... 13 
3.1 What is a water market?.......................................................................................... 14 
4. Costs and benefits of water trading............................................................................... 15 
4.1 Overview................................................................................................................. 16 
4.2 The potential costs and benefits of water markets across northern Australia......... 19 
4.3 Efficiency................................................................................................................ 25 
4.4 Effectiveness ........................................................................................................... 26 
4.5 Equity...................................................................................................................... 28 
4.6 Administrative and transaction costs ...................................................................... 32 
4.7 Potential environmental consequences of water markets across the north ............. 35 
4.8 Political feasibility and likely adoption rates.......................................................... 40 
4.9 Social justice issues relating to Indigenous (non-market) livelihoods.................... 41 
5. Alternate non-market approaches to meeting north Australia’s water allocation needs
........................................................................................................................................... 43 
6. Conclusions................................................................................................................... 47 
References......................................................................................................................... 50 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1: Map of study region (source: Tropical Rivers and Coastal Knowledge network)
........................................................................................................................................... 12 
Figure 2: Respondents from Nikolakis et al (2010) who agreed that the benefits of trading 
would be higher than the costs.......................................................................................... 24 
Figure 3: Respondents from Nikolakis et al (2010) who agreed that certain catchments 
and aquifers should be preserved...................................................................................... 36 
 
List of tables 
 
Table 1: Licenses and entitlements, trading and types of trade 2007-8 (NWC 2008)...... 14 
Table 2: Impacts of trading on the environment in the MDB (information sourced from 
NWC 2010 a) .................................................................................................................... 17 
Table 3:  Irrigation areas in the TRaCK area (source: Petheram et al 2008c) .................. 19 
Table 4:  Some potential costs and benefits from water trading in northern Australia 
(sourced from Nikolakis et al., 2010) ............................................................................... 20 
Table 5: Examining environmental regulations related to trade in the region (drawn from 
NWC 2010b)..................................................................................................................... 39 
 ii
 Summary 
 
This report is the final of three reports and part of a two year project entitled Establishing 
water markets in northern Australia: a study to assess feasibility and consequences of 
market-based mechanisms of water delivery undertaken through the Australian National 
University’s Crawford School of Economics and Government. The Tropical Rivers and 
Coastal Knowledge (TRaCK) hub funded this project under Theme 6.1 “Sustainable 
Enterprises”. This research is also being done in collaboration with the North Australian 
Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance (NAILSMA).  
 
This third report provides an assessment of the potential costs and benefits of water 
markets across northern Australia with consideration of efficiency, equity and 
effectiveness criteria. The region under focus is the tropical belt of northern Australia 
which comprises the jurisdictions of Queensland, Northern Territory and Western 
Australia, (with attention on the Gulf, Timor and North East drainage divisions).  
 
Water trading is at a formative stage in northern Australia, with few (if any) recorded 
trades at the time of writing. Markets have been effective in southern Australia in 
providing flexibility to irrigators and supporting productivity through reallocation during 
drought. Markets under the National Water Initiative (NWI) are seen as an effective tool 
to optimise economic, social and ecological values associated with water.  
 
There are preconditions for a water market to be effective. Important is for there to be 
low to medium transactions costs. A transaction cost is the costs involved in executing a 
trade that are above and beyond the actual price paid for the water (they can include 
travel time, fees, title searches and other costs). The potential for high and increased 
transactions costs is significant across northern Australia. A key reason for this is 
uncertainty over Indigenous rights and interests to water, which if not resolved could 
impose constraints on water markets. This suggests that there must be greater certainty 
around Indigenous involvement in water markets.  
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 There are environmental costs associated with water markets. Experience in the Murray 
Darling Basin highlights there have been environmental impacts from water trading 
(though it is acknowledged that it is difficult to separate these impacts from the effects of 
drought and increased development). These impacts include increased salinity, and 
effects from the physical change in the timing and location of water use. One outcome of 
the development of water markets in southern Australia was the activation of sleeper and 
dozer entitlements- this meant more water was being used. Across northern Australia 
most rivers are not perennial, there is a reliance on groundwater and the expansion of 
storages is constrained There is the potential in northern Australia for environmental 
impacts from trade. These impacts include: increased salinity in-stream; water logging 
from more on-farm use; saltwater intrusion because of reduced flows; and during the dry 
increased nutrient loads could threaten the health of rivers. These issues can be addressed 
through management efforts. For example, in the Ord, water managers have increased dry 
season flows to disperse nutrients from agricultural activity.  
 
Efficiency is key aim of water markets. Economic efficiency arises when all the gains 
from trade have been exhausted and the costs imposed on others from water use have 
been fully accounted for in the decision making of water users. Any assessment of 
efficiency of water markets, however, requires more than simply a comparison of 
quantified private costs and benefits. This is because, typically, water markets have been 
implemented only for consumptive uses of water and the effects of water use on 
downstream users and the environment have typically been ignored or not fully 
considered.  Any assessment of efficiency in the north must seek to integrate customary 
or ecological values, but it is acknowledged that this is complex as these values are 
intangible and difficult to quantify.  
 
Issues of equity are important in the transition to water access rights. In the north, equity 
should be given increased prominence because there is a significant Indigenous 
population in the region who are subject to chronic socioeconomic disadvantage. In 
allocating property rights to water there will need to be consideration of Indigenous 
Australians. Including Indigenous people in water markets through a structure that is 
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 appropriate will offer challenges to policy makers. Quantifying the amounts of water to 
be provided for consumptive purposes and non consumptive purposes (such as spiritual 
values) is also complex. There will need to be considerable Indigenous community 
consultation to ensure principles of equity are upheld. Water planning should provide 
important parameters to ensure Indigenous customary aspirations are not threatened by 
water trading. There will need to be consideration of surface and groundwater 
connectivity, and the effect of extraction on groundwater dependent ecosystems, which 
are of high importance to Indigenous people in the region.  These parameters should be 
reflected in trading rules. Ongoing Indigenous collaboration and engagement in water 
allocation is essential- such efforts should be underpinned by capacity development.  
 
The concept of water markets can be politically contentious.  In our first work for this 
project, community opposition was identified as a key barrier to the development of 
water markets by research participants. However, it is important to emphasise that a 
slender majority of all respondents in our second study agreed that water markets would 
be useful in their region. Indigenous respondents were more likely to agree that water 
markets would be useful. But respondents imposed conditions on how markets should 
operate. Respondents placed a high value on environmental and cultural assets, and 
Indigenous involvement in water markets was important. It was suggested by participants 
that there is required more community awareness on water reform and on water markets. 
There is little awareness that markets can support the optimisation of environmental, 
economic and social values to water (which is an overarching objective of the NWI).  
 
Non market approaches may be more appropriate in some areas than markets. Markets 
are efficient in optimising the allocation of water where scarcity and competition exist. 
Markets may by themselves be incapable of achieving ecological or equity outcomes. A 
blend of approaches to allocating water may be more suitable. There is a growing trend in 
water management for increased collaboration and stakeholder driven governance 
approaches. Central to these approaches are inclusivity and capacity building. 
Collaborative efforts provide a structure for stakeholders to develop rules over allocation 
and management of water, as well rules for enforcement and compliance. Efforts will be 
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 required to include Indigenous interests in collaborative approaches. A key barrier in the 
experience of collaborative approaches in New Zealand is uncertainty around customary 
rights to water. Uncertainty over customary rights exists across northern Australia, and 
has the potential to reduce collaboration between stakeholders and constrain water 
planning and management efforts. Resolving Indigenous rights to water through creation 
of Indigenous property rights may address this uncertainty.  
 4
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Glossary  
 
Aquifer: An underground geological formation which can yield 
quantities of groundwater for extraction.  
 
Consumptive pool:  The actual volume of water made available for consumptive 
use, which generally set out in a water plan for the specific 
resource.  
 
Consumptive use: Water made available for private use, for both commercial 
and personal activities.  
 
Cultural flow:  An allocation of water to be managed by Indigenous 
peoples to meet their unique customary aspirations in their 
traditional territories.  
 
Effectiveness: Effectiveness relates to the ability of water markets to 
achieve their desired objectives. 
 
 
Efficiency: Economic efficiency in simple terms is where the 
cumulative benefits of reallocation are greater than the 
costs 
   
 
Environmental flow: The amount of water necessary to maintain the health of a 
waterway and dependent ecosystems.  
 
Equity: A principle that prescribes a fair allocation and distribution of 
resources (such as water) 
 
Native title: Those rights and processes accorded under the Native Title 
Act (1993) (Commonwealth) to Indigenous Australians.  
 
Sustainable:  The responsible management and allocation of water 
resources, guided by the aim of balancing all the competing 
needs for water.  
Tradable commodity:  Something which is sold simply as a good and price is 
determined by supply and demand. 
 
Transaction costs: Are those costs above and beyond the cost for the good or 
service in a transaction. It may include title searches, trade 
approvals, negotiating and enforcing contracts 
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 Unbundling: Is part of the water reform process that separates water from 
land title and converts it into a water access entitlement or 
water allocation.  
 
Water access entitlement: An ongoing entitlement to exclusive access to a share of water 
from a specific consumptive pool defined in a water plan.  
 
Water allocation:  The amount of water provided in a licence to use or for water 
access entitlements in a given period as identified in the rules 
of the specific water plan.  
 
Water market:    Allows water trading to occur. 
Water trading:  Involves the buying and selling of water access entitlements, 
also often called 'water rights'.  
Water plan:  A statutory plan or government endorsed water allocation 
plan for both surface and groundwater systems which is 
developed using scientific assessment and done in 
consultation with stakeholders to support sustainable water 
use.  
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 1. Project overview 
 
This study, entitled “Establishing water markets in northern Australia: a study to assess 
feasibility and consequences of market-based mechanisms of water delivery,” is a two 
year project, funded through, theme 6.1 of TRaCK.  There are three tasks for this project: 
 
1. Analyse current institutional arrangements and constraints for establishing water 
markets across Queensland, NT and Western Australia,1 
2. Analyse key stakeholder attitudes and values relating to water trading and 
consideration of the implications for the establishment of markets,2 
3. Assess the costs and benefits of introducing water trading to northern Australia 
ensuring consideration of efficiency, effectiveness and equity criteria. This 
assessment should include consideration of  
 Likely adoption rates 
 Administrative and transaction costs 
 Environmental consequences 
 Political feasibility 
 Social justice issues relating to Indigenous (non-market) 
livelihoods 
 Alternate non-market approaches to meeting north Australia’s 
water allocation needs. 
 
This report, Task 3 presents the costs and benefits of markets in the north. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Task 1 examined institutional arrangements for water markets across northern Australia and the 
constraints present. This report is available at: http://www.track.gov.au/publications/registry/772   
 
2 Task 2 analysed stakeholder attitudes and values to water markets across northern Australia. This report is 
available at: http://www.track.gov.au/publications/registry/857  
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 2. Introduction 
Aims 
 
Water markets are not widespread across the north. However, jurisdictions have 
committed to implement market regimes under the National Water Initiative (NWI). This 
report looks at the potential costs and benefits of water markets across the region. Our 
results are based on findings from two previous studies over the last two years on water 
markets in the north. These studies analysed institutional arrangements through in-depth 
interviews with opinion leaders, experts and policy makers (42 interviews in total); and 
examined stakeholder attitudes and values to water markets across the north (120 
industry, Indigenous, government and recreational users). This final report collates the 
findings from these earlier studies and we consider these costs and benefits in light of 
efficiency, effectiveness and equity criteria.  
 
We also discuss in our analysis likely adoption rates of water markets, administrative and 
transaction costs, environmental consequences; political feasibility (and costs); and social 
justice issues for Indigenous livelihoods. In conclusion we consider non market 
approaches that may be used across the north.  
 
Background 
The study region 
 
The tropical belt of northern Australia is sparsely populated. It covers an area of more 
than one million square kilometres (or 25% of the Australian estate) and only hosts 2% of 
the nation’s population (Carson et al., 2009). There is a prominent Indigenous population 
who own almost a third of the land base under a variety of tenures (Altman et al., 2009). 
Over half of the nation’s annual runoff (100,000 GL) occurs in three drainage divisions in 
the region: the Timor Sea, Gulf and Northern North East drainage divisions (Petheram et 
al., 2010).  The exploitation of these water resources has held a strong fascination for 
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 some Australians (Pigram, 2006). But irrigated agriculture remains a minor land use, with 
pastoral activity covering approximately 90% of the landscape (NAWLT, 2009).  
 
Development pressure 
 
There has been a re-focused attention on the potential to exploit northern Australia’s 
water resources for southern Australia’s water security (Edmonds, 2007); and for 
expanded irrigation development in the north (North Australian Land and Water 
Taskforce 2009). The Commonwealth Government committed $195 million in 2008-
2010 to the expansion of the Ord Irrigation project in the East Kimberley (Department of 
State Development, 2009).  
 
A recent report delivered to the Federal Government by the  North Australian Land and 
Water Taskforce (NAWLT) suggests that groundwater resources in the region could 
support the expansion of irrigated agriculture by anywhere from 100% to 200%  in the 
region- or 20,000 to 40,000 hectares (NAWLT 2009).  NAWLT (2009) identify that 
some 600 GL of groundwater could be available to support new consumptive uses. 
However, NAWLT emphasise that despite high rainfall, the north is for most of the year 
in water deficit- rain is seasonal, there are high rates of evaporation, and most rain falls 
near the coast which constrains storages (NAWLT 2009).  
 
Creswell et al (2009) argue that the ecological costs of pursuing irrigated agriculture are 
too high in the region. They identify the strong reliance of customary and ecological 
values to groundwater in the dry season which may be threatened by extraction (Creswell 
et al., 2009). The implications from allocations are not well understood, so a 
precautionary approach has generally been taken in the north (Nikolakis and Grafton, 
2009).  It is suggested that going forward this precautionary approach be maintained, 
with allocation decisions based on best available science and community input (Hart, 
2004).  
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 Figure 1: Map of study region (source: Tropical Rivers and Coastal Knowledge network) 
 
 
 
 
National water reform  
 
The governance of water is a critical factor in the global water crisis (McKay, 2007). This 
governance problem for water management has been recognized in Australia for some 
time, culminating in the National Water Initiative (NWI) in 2004. The NWI, an inter-
governmental agreement between the Commonwealth, states and territories, sought to 
create common standards in statutory water planning and to enable water trading; as well 
as encourage water accounting, metering, monitoring and pricing (among other things) 
(NWC, 2009b). Another important consideration in the NWI was the recognition in 
statutory water plans of the environment (see para. 37 (i) NWI for example) and 
Indigenous users (para. 52-54 NWI, 2004). States and territories are to account for these 
non consumptive uses.  
 
Each state and territory in Australia committed to implement these reforms outlined in 
the NWI to water management. With its focus on property rights and market 
mechanisms, the NWI is considered to be the most important change in water policy 
 12
 since Federation (Connell et al., 2005). While the creation of the NWI was a significant 
event the, NWI is a non binding legal instrument. The approach by jurisdictions to 
implementing NWI led reform has been uneven. This is particularly so for measures to 
encourage water trading (NWC 2009). In the north, Connell et al. (2009) suggest an 
incremental approach to reform and for the development of instruments such as water 
markets- this approach can encourage stakeholders to collaborate, and help avoid 
problems such as over-allocation and degradation of aquatic systems like that 
experienced in the MDB.  
3. Institutional setting for water markets 
 
Overview  
 
Each state and territory in Australia is vested ownership and responsibility of water 
resources through statute. As described in section 2 of this report, the NWI encouraged a 
convergence in water policy and management among the states and territories, with a 
focus on the development of markets to encourage risk sharing and flexibility among 
users (NWC, 2009a). The potential to trade water exists in the three jurisdictions in 
northern Australia: this is supported in relevant legislation in the NT and Queensland, and 
in policy in Western Australia. 3 However, little to no trading has occurred across the 
region (see Table 1). Around 98% of total trade in water entitlements occurs in South-
Eastern Australia (NWC, 2009b).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Water Act (1992) (amended 2004) NT; the Water Act (2000) and Water Regulations 2002 in Queensland; 
and the Rights in Water and Irrigation Act (1914) (RIWI Act) provides the framework for water 
governance in the State, and an Operational Policy 5.13 provides for trade of water entitlement transactions 
in WA.  
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Table 1: Licenses and entitlements, trading and types of trade 2007-8 (NWC, 2009b) 
 
 Volume of Licenses or 
Entitlements 
Volume of Trade 
(2008) 
General types of trade 
available in plan areas 
NT 494,000 ML of licenses 0 • Temporary 
(annual) and  
• Permanent 
QLD 3.6 GL of water 
entitlements 
75, 968 ML ($57.7 M) 
most in southern QLD 
 
44.5% was part of a 
property sale 
• Permanent;   
• Lease and,  
• Seasonal water 
assignment (a 
temporary trade).  
 
WA 2.5 GL of licenses 486 ML  ($1 M) most 
in the south west of 
WA  
 
57 % was part of a 
property sale 
• Volumetric 
licenses can be 
traded in whole or 
in part to another 
eligible party (i.e. 
someone else who 
has access to land). 
 
3.1 What is a water market? 
 
A water market allows the exchange of water between willing buying and sellers. A seller 
may transfer whole or part of their water license or entitlement, or temporarily trade (or 
lease) whole or part of their allocation for the year. There has been an increasing focus by 
water managers on demand side strategies to deal with scarcity, and improve water use 
efficiency and productivity. Water markets are considered to be efficient in allocating 
water between consumptive users, but the effect of markets on non-consumptive users 
and third party impacts have been a major concern in literature (Saliba, 1987; Livingston, 
1995). In commitments under the NWI, state and territory governments were to expand 
the use of water trading (NWI, para. 60 (iv) (b)). Trading under the NWI framework 
would occur within a plan which reflects social, economic and ecological considerations. 
Water entitlement holders would have a right to access an amount of the flow designated 
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 for consumptive use in the plan (para 30 schedule D). Australia has been at the forefront 
of developing water markets to encourage efficiency and structural adjustment (Crase et 
al., 2004). There has been significant growth in water trading, with 1800 GL of water 
traded in 2008-9, at a value of $2.2 billion dollars (an increase of 95% from the previous 
year according to NWC, 2009 a).  
 
Grafton and Peterson (2007) suggest that in the Australian experience there are 
significant gaps in understanding impacts of water trading. The authors suggest there is a 
common need to understand environmental flows and desired ecological outcomes, and 
more clarity on water pricing, transaction costs and the social impacts of water trading. 
The Northern Australia Land and Water Taskforce (2009) confirms the lack of data 
across the north to support planning, but views the implementation of NWI consistent 
water planning and trade as being important for managing water sustainably (NAWLT, 
2009).  
 
Northern Australia remains at the frontier of water management. There is a pressing need 
to consider the potential effect of water markets across the north; especially given the 
increased attention on the region as a food bowl or source of water for southern Australia.  
There are a range of ecological and customary values linked to water that could be 
threatened by increased water extraction for consumptive use. This work undertakes an 
exploratory analysis of the potential costs and benefits of water markets, with a focus on 
equity and environmental outcomes.  
 
4. Costs and benefits of water trading 
 
We take a broad assessment of costs and benefits in this report, examining ecological, 
social and economic outcomes, including non-market customary outcomes. This reflects 
the inter-disciplinary nature of water research. Drawing on scholarly literature, we first 
identify some of the costs and benefits associated with water markets where they occur 
(such as in southern Australia). The second part of this section provides an analysis of the 
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 potential costs and benefits of water markets across northern Australia. We must 
emphasise the potential costs and benefits because it is too early in the north Australian 
context to identify any actual costs and benefits of trading. At the time of writing, there 
had been little (if any) water trading across the region. However we draw on data from 
two earlier reports in this study which provide empirical findings for this analysis (see 
Nikolakis and Grafton, 2009; and Nikolakis et al 2010).   
 
4.1 Overview  
 
Water is not like other commodities and water markets must be accompanied with robust 
institutional and regulatory arrangements. Water markets will not solve all problems nor 
are they suitable for every situation, but markets can provide an efficient response to 
changing trends in demand; and can encourage investment and provide security to users 
(Thobani, 1997). As pressure increases on water supplies, users demand more reliability 
and the margin for error in managing ecological assets heightens. Under certain 
perspectives, water markets are seen to overcome resource misallocation associated with 
‘rule’ based management.  Pigram (1993) suggests that users will opt for more efficient 
use- this self interest rather than command and control is argued to be the most “reliable 
way for generating efficiency” (Pigram, 1993: 1314). But water markets are prone to 
failure and should be underpinned by robust institutions which improve security of the 
resource, but at the same time considering transaction costs, which can impede markets 
(Livingston, 1995).   
 
In southern Australia, water markets have supported adjustment in drought. The NWC 
(2010 b) identifies that in the MDB water markets have enabled the purchase of 
entitlements to improve environmental flow; impacts from trade include increased in-
stream salinity; and where trading between users involves changing the timing and 
location of water use- the NWC suggests these costs are small compared to the benefit of 
environmental buy back. Table 2 identifies some of the environmental outcomes from 
water trading in the MDB. In terms of social impacts, it is difficult to discern the effects 
of markets from broader impacts of drought, but the NWC found that water trading has 
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 supported structural adjustment and provided flexibility to irrigators during drought 
(NWC, 2010 a). The NWC identifies that agricultural productivity was sustained because 
of water markets in the MDB (NWC, 2010a).  
 
Table 2: Impacts of trading on the environment in the MDB (information sourced from 
NWC, 2010 a) 
 
Environmental impact from trade Description 
Overall impacts Trading can have an effect if it results in 
physical changes in flows, resulting in 
different timing and location of use. 
 
Water use and flows The impacts on flow from trading have 
been minimal compared to that from 
drought and development. Water has 
generally flowed downstream in trade.  
 
Key environmental assets There is no evidence that the timing and 
location of flows from trading has had an 
effect on important sites (such as Ramsar-
listed wetlands) 
 
In-stream salinity and groundwater Trading has increased in stream salinity. 
Attempts have been made to offset this 
through the Basin Salinity Management 
Strategy.  
 
There is little groundwater trading in the 
MDB. Surface water trade may increase 
groundwater recharge in some areas.  
 
Other environmental impacts Increased water use efficiency may reduce 
return flows to the environment- which in 
turn may improve water quality. 
 
 
Jurisdictions such as the Western U.S and Chile have established water markets. 
Reallocation through trade has shown to support economically efficient adaptation to 
drought and cross sector trade between irrigation and urban users (in the Colorado Basin, 
see Livingston, 1995). Trade in the Western US is steadily increasing, but third party 
impacts (so those affected by a trade but who are not party to a trade) continues to 
impede the effectiveness of markets (Donohew, 2009). The outcomes from Chile’s water 
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 markets can be observed over a period of three decades, with benefits including greater 
security to irrigators which increased investment in high value fruit crops, increased 
autonomy to irrigator associations who have maintained infrastructure competently, and 
greater flexibility offers more options to users- but it must be noted that most trade at the 
time was linked to land sales because of high transaction costs (Crane, 1994). In Chile, 
the use of markets has not encouraged the investment in water use efficiency as expected 
(Crane, 1994) and there has been a transfer from small farms to larger entities (Trawick, 
2003). Bauer (2004) suggests a balanced approach in assessing results from Chile, while 
markets have encouraged investment, there has also been speculation and equity issues 
with the concentration of water rights in monopoly users. Institutional arrangements in 
Chile tend be weak on supporting environmental and social outcomes, and are not 
considered to be consistent with principles of integrated water resources management 
(Bauer, 2004).  
 
Markets require robust institutions to minimise impacts. Chong and Sunding (2006) 
outline that imperfect water markets (those not supported by appropriate institutions) can 
have effects such as third party impacts and increased transaction costs. This is especially 
where there is connectivity between groundwater and surface systems, with impacts on 
the environment and downstream users. The authors’ state that water is not a regular 
commodity as quantity is only one consideration. Crase et al. (2004) view markets as 
compounding ecological problems by encouraging the use and activation of sleeper 
entitlements.  This point emphasises that markets to be effective, need flexibility in trade, 
but at the same time require adequate institutions and regulation to protect third party 
users (particularly the environment and non consumptive users) with minimal transaction 
costs (NWC, 2009 b).  Accounting for and integrating third party users remains an 
important challenge to water markets in Australia and abroad, as policy makers attempt to 
balance the need for efficient trade with protecting the environment and third party users 
(Donohew, 2009; NWC, 2009b; Saliba, 1987).  
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 4.2 The potential costs and benefits of water markets across 
northern Australia 
 
Markets are at a formative stage in northern Australia, with little to no trading at the time 
of writing. There have been studies to assess perceptions of water markets such as Straton 
et al. (2009). There is also our previous work on the feasibility and viability of water 
markets across northern Australia. Apart from this work data is generally limited as to the 
performance of water markets. For this report we rely on our previous research and other 
scholarly literature.  
 
Our first report for this study provided an analysis of institutional arrangements for water 
markets in the region (see Nikolakis and Grafton 2009). Interviewees argued that 
establishing market frameworks was proactive. Interviewees suggested that having 
effective water plans and markets in place would provide flexibility and risk sharing as 
demand matures.  This is very different to the situation in southern Australia where 
markets have been used to claw back entitlements in systems that are historically over-
allocated. Interviewees in the study also suggested that having a cap on extractions and a 
price for water would create the right incentives for efficient water use (Nikolakis and 
Grafton, 2009).  
 
Table 3:  Irrigation areas in the TRaCK area (source: Petheram et al., 2008c) 
 
Area Size (ha) Product 
Katherine Douglas Daly – 
groundwater 
2,200  Perennial horticulture, field 
crops (maize, peanuts, 
fodder) 
Ord River Irrigation Area 13,000 Sugarcane, sandalwood, 
annual and perennial 
horticulture 
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 In the second report for this study, we examined stakeholder attitudes and values (see 
Nikolakis et al., 2010). One hundred and twenty stakeholders from government, 
Indigenous, industry and recreational user groups participated in the study from across 
northern Australia. A key finding from this report was that Indigenous respondents saw 
the development of water markets as offering a potential revenue stream for the many 
disadvantaged communities across the region (Nikolakis et al. 2010).  
 
Table 4:  Some potential costs and benefits from water trading in northern Australia 
(sourced from Nikolakis et al., 2010) 
 
Ecological  
 
 
 
 
Costs 
 
• Increased salinity and water logging 
• Physical changes to flow caused by 
different timing and location of 
water use – may increase sediment 
and nutrient loads which can effect 
ecological assets, particularly in the 
dry.  
• Saltwater intrusion in rivers 
because of reduced flow 
• Incentive to sell water or apply it on 
farm- in particularly the activation 
of sleeper or dozer entitlements- 
less water kept in stream 
• Impact of dry season extraction on 
aquatic and riparian environments 
and groundwater dependent 
ecosystems 
 
Benefits 
 
• Defined ecological thresholds 
• Improved knowledge of resource 
base from planning and monitoring 
• Ability to purchase water for the 
environment to maintain a net 
downstream movement of water 
during drought 
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 Social  
 
 
 
 
Costs 
• Failure to recognize non 
consumptive uses 
• Structural adjustment- impact on 
marginal activity- this could limit 
diversity 
• Entrench inequity for Indigenous 
groups 
 
Benefits: 
 
• Flexibility to irrigators 
• Reallocation during drought can 
support productivity and 
employment 
Economic Costs 
• Increased homogeneity in 
production 
• Increased red tape and costs on 
business 
• Increased barriers of entry 
 
Benefits 
• Certainty to growers encourages 
investment 
• Reallocation supports productivity 
during drought 
• Highest and best use 
• More area under production 
because of increased water use 
efficiency and the ability to trade to 
other parts of the plan area 
• For some Indigenous interests there 
is the potential for economic 
opportunities through water trading 
or water based enterprise 
development 
 
 
In Nikolakis et al. (2010) nearly half of respondents associated the following benefits 
with water markets: 
 
i. Highest and best use 
ii. Increased water use efficiency 
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 iii. Greater flexibility to users 
iv. Improved knowledge of the resource 
 
Twenty three stakeholders identified that markets could provide certainty to 
horticulturists, which would encourage development in the region. This is emphasised by 
a respondent that: 
 
“For farming you need a 10 to 15 year outlook. You need all the resources 
to be there, all your ducks in a row. Particularly with tree crops, you 
might not see a return for 7 years on some trees.”   
 
While sixteen respondents felt that water markets could provide economic opportunities 
to meet Indigenous economic aspirations. A respondent articulates that: 
 
“…if water goes to Indigenous people to manage environmental and 
cultural values and has involvement in the commercial side, it could be 
beneficial.”  
 
Almost 70% of Indigenous respondents in Nikolakis et al. (2010) believed that the 
economic benefits of water trading would be significant for Indigenous communities.  
 
Forty eight respondents in the study felt that water trading in the region would increase 
the financial cost of regulation, administration and monitoring of the system. These costs 
would be passed on to producers, whose operations would become marginal. A 
government respondent suggests that: 
 
“At the present time, only a fraction of the water planning and 
management costs incurred by the Queensland Government are passed on 
to water users.”  
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 If the costs of water management and planning were passed on to industry this would 
impose constraints on irrigation. An irrigator argues from the experience of water 
markets in southern Queensland that: 
 
“Traditional irrigators it has been shown cannot afford to buy in [to 
water markets]. They are outcompeted by coal mines. So there is a 
transfer in water from low to high value uses which have higher economic 
returns. This has social implications.” 
 
These social implications no doubt refer to the decline of family farms in marginal areas. 
This change then leads to a reduction of services (schools, hospitals and financial 
services) in an area and a further migration of people. The result is community decline.  
 
The study identified concerns among twenty six respondents who felt that trading would 
result in environmental impacts. For instance, a respondent suggested that water trading:  
 
“…goes hand in hand with increased water extraction and ecological 
impacts such as pollution of river systems.”  
 
There were references made to the situation in the MDB where the integrity of the system 
has been threatened. These respondents tended to attribute water trading with 
environmental decline in the MDB, rather than seeing trading as a tool to address the 
consequences of over-allocation and drought.  
 
There were concerns of a decline in water quality and community health from water 
trading, particularly the health of communities reliant on these water sources. There was 
a fear that Indigenous people would be marginalised from water resources and unable to 
meet their cultural obligations.  
 
Overall there were mixed responses as to whether the benefits of water trading would 
outweigh the costs in northern Australia. Around one third of respondents neither agreed 
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 nor disagreed; a third of respondents agreed and another third disagreed.  This suggests 
there remains uncertainty as to the effect of water markets. Without adequate data or 
experience such a view is well founded.  
 
Figure 2: Respondents from Nikolakis et al. (2010) who agreed that the benefits of 
trading would be higher than the costs 
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Those respondents who agreed that the benefits of water markets would outweigh the 
costs focused on the improved efficiency and the re-allocation of water to highest and 
best use. Imposing a price on water it is argued would change user behaviour. This 
‘economic argument’ is explained by a respondent: 
  
“The economic arguments for allocating resources through market like 
mechanisms are very strong. The key advantage include[s] an increase in net 
returns (surpluses) to society, better resources, and a transparent signalling 
(price) mechanism. The incentives that water markets create include better exit 
signals for less productive performers, as well as more flexible opportunities for 
new developments…Water trading enables users to make considered decisions 
about water use, and…sees the value of their water as a secure asset.”  
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A respondent sums up the view that having a market framework in place may not be 
urgent but is proactive, the respondent articulates: 
 
“At this point in time the level of water use and competition for water is relatively 
low, thus the cost of market establishment appears greater than the perceived 
benefit. However, the potential for significant accelerated…water use in some 
areas is recognised, largely depending on significant developments. Careful 
monitoring of [the] level of use should provide a useful signal on timing of market 
establishment.”  
 
Such a view suggests an incremental approach to introducing water trading, akin to the 
approach in Western Australia of categorising systems (from C1 to C4 which is fully 
allocated). The underlying message is that having a market framework in place is prudent 
and can take effect as demand for water matures.  
 
4.3 Efficiency 
 
Efficiency is viewed as a defining characteristic of an effective water market. Economic 
efficiency arises when all the gains from trade have been exhausted and the costs 
imposed on others from water use have been fully accounted for in the decision making 
of water users. Competitive water markets allow water to be transferred from lower to 
higher value consumptive uses thereby increases the aggregate value of what is produced 
from the use of water. Thus, restrictions on trade reduce economic efficiency. By 
ensuring that water has a price over and above the cost of delivery, water markets can 
also promote water-use efficiency (Qureshi et al., 2010). This is because if a farmer can 
undertake an investment or practice that can reduce water use at a cost less than the price 
of water in a water market, this will be done because it will increase the farmer’s net 
returns. Thus, the higher the price of water in a water market, the greater the number of 
water use efficiency investments and practices will be undertaken.  
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Any assessment of efficiency of water markets, however, requires more than simply a 
comparison of quantified private costs and benefits. This is because, typically, water 
markets have been implemented only for consumptive uses of water and the effects of 
water use on downstream users and the environment have typically been ignored or not 
fully considered. In other words, as articulated by Saliba (1987): 
 
“If all values associated with water are encompassed in property rights, then 
market prices will reflect social values, and rights holders will be faced with the 
full opportunity of their water use and transfer decisions. Efficiency requires that 
external effects of a transfer be internalised into market decision making” (1116).  
 
Jackson (2005) describes that Indigenous values to water tend to be distinct from non 
Indigenous values, as well they are intangible and difficult to quantify. This may offer 
challenges to integrate these customary values into the water property right (and for this 
to be reflected in the price of water).  Therefore, any assessment of efficiency in the north 
must seek to integrate values, like customary or ecological values, which are difficult to 
quantify, to provide an accurate assessment.   
4.4 Effectiveness 
 
Effectiveness relates to the ability of water markets to achieve their desired objectives. 
The NWI led reforms were focused on optimising economic, social and ecological 
outcomes, with markets supporting the achievement of objectives set out in water plans 
(Connell et al., 2005). Across the north there will be a diverse set of objectives for 
markets, tailored to local economic, social and ecological considerations. Measuring 
whether markets are achieving the desired objectives is difficult in the north Australian 
context- there is little data for which to measure or evaluate the performance of markets. 
Markets are at a formative stage, there have been no trades (none unattached to a sale of 
property) and it is premature to make an assessment of the effectiveness of markets. 
However, drawing on experience from literature on water markets in southern Australia 
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 and abroad, we assess the potential for markets to achieve social, economic and 
ecological outcomes. 
 
It is clear that the effectiveness of markets will be constrained (or at least influenced) by 
structural factors, location, demographic and economic trends. They will not necessarily 
be useful across all of the north. But in our previous work, respondents and interviewees 
emphasised the importance of having functioning institutional arrangements in place to 
avoid the problem of over-allocation (Nikolakis and Grafton, 2009; Nikolakis et al., 
2010). Markets can integrate environmental values for water and rules to protect cultural 
values (Nikolakis and Grafton, 2009). Regulation can underpin markets by specifying 
limits, such as the location of trade and for encouraging social and economic stability 
(Pigram, 1993).This issue of over-allocation has appeared in aquifer extraction in the NT, 
with efforts by government to cap use and to facilitate trading in the Tindall aquifer 
allocation plan. The plan emphasises the need for adaptive management as groundwater 
trading has its unique challenges, and the ecological effects of trading intra-aquifer are 
not well understood (Straton et al., 2009).  
 
While the ambition of the NWI is to manage economic, social and ecological outcomes, 
across the north, a fourth consideration should be added - customary outcomes. 
Customary considerations offer great uncertainty to water planners and managers: 
primarily these values are intangible and distinct, so are difficult to quantify for policy 
(Jackson, 2005). Customary values are at heightened risk from the operation of markets, 
for there is little data on groundwater and surface water interaction, or understanding of 
the effect of extraction on groundwater dependent ecosystems (which are highly 
important to Indigenous people across the region for customary purposes: see Cooper and 
Jackson, 2008; Touissant et al., 2005). Efforts are being made in the Northern Territory at 
present to understand a ‘cultural flow’ in water plans for Indigenous groups in the plan 
area; as well as understand the amount of water that will support Indigenous economic 
outcomes. This last point is very important to Indigenous people across the region - water 
is anticipated by Indigenous people as providing one way to address Indigenous socio-
economic disadvantage (see Nikolakis et al., 2010).  
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In other jurisdictions markets have supported the achievement of economic, social and 
environmental outcomes. For example, most recently the NWC (2010a) in a 10 year 
study on social impacts of trading in the Murray Darling Basin (MDB) found that 
markets in the MDB have optimised economic, social and environmental values to water. 
Water trading supported productivity through reallocation of water during drought- 
economic modelling identifies a $220 million increase in Australia’s GDP through 
reallocations of agricultural water in 2008-9. Inter-regional trading was particularly 
important during this period. However, literature emphasises the importance of robust 
institutional arrangements to support effective water markets (Easter, 2004).  
 
4.5 Equity 
 
Equity prescribes a principle of fairness in the allocation and distribution of resources. 
There has been a tendency to focus on efficiency rather than equity in assessing the 
performance of water markets. The principle of equity is identified as an important 
element of water management (Syme et al., 1999) and a key concern for water markets 
(Saliba, 1987). Ward and Pulido-Velazquez (2008) assert that achieving equity is the 
biggest challenge confronting water policy makers. Focusing on efficiency according to 
Ingram et al. (2008) fails to address and integrate values that are not easily quantified 
(such as spiritual values). Such issues are particularly important for Indigenous 
Australians who are said to have more non use values to water than non Indigenous 
Australians (Venn and Quiggin, 2007).  
 
It is important to emphasise that issues of equity are significant for all. There is a well- 
founded concern that equitable access to water is becoming increasingly difficult on a 
global scale. Gleick (1996, 1998) argues that access to water should be a basic human 
right supported by legislation based on his review of international statements, agreements 
and State practice. Over the last decade water privatization, especially in the developing 
world, has spurred alter-globalisation and anti-privatization campaigns centred on 
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 establishing access to water as a human right (Bakker, 2007). It is only recently, on 
September 30, 2010, that the United Nations officially declared access to water as a 
legally enforceable right (OHCHR, 2010). While their declaration refers primarily to the 
basic needs required to sustain life, the implications of this declaration sets an important 
global precedent for water equity. As Indigenous Australians across northern Australia 
are subject to socio-economic disadvantage, the issue of equitable access to water is 
particularly acute.  
 
The consideration of equity becomes more important as property regimes develop for 
water. Before the creation of a market the benefits of water are distributed among 
consumptive and non consumptive users. Shifting towards a system of tradable rights can 
require trade-offs between consumptive users, and between consumptive users and non 
consumptive users. Those users who are allocated entitlements equal or greater to the 
amount they previously had access to are considered winners. While those assigned less 
water or no water at all are considered to have lost- for these users must purchase water 
to get access. For Indigenous people this is an issue of acute importance, for as Taylor et 
al (2010) argue, Indigenous groups in the northern tropical rivers region are the ‘have 
nots’ in the socio-economic system. If they do not have access to water there will be 
considerable consequences for their livelihoods. This loss is inter-generational. The 
situation in southern Australia provides a valuable lesson: Indigenous groups in the 
Murray Darling Basin have not been provided access to water, and the price of water has 
increased to the point where there are significant barriers to entry into the market 
(Jackson et al., 2009). 
 
During this period of market based reform, Jackson and Altman (2009) identify an acute 
need to ensure that water allocation is equitable. The authors suggest further analysis is 
required on the impacts of excluding Indigenous people from water markets. The NWI 
(2004) explicitly recognised Indigenous access to water. The NWI states that water plans 
wherever possible should make provision for Indigenous social, spiritual and customary 
objectives, and recognise native title rights (see paragraphs 52 to 54 NWI 2004). While 
this recognition is important, Jackson and Morrison (2007) state that there was little 
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 Indigenous involvement in the creation of the NWI. Another critique is that while there 
may be expectations that the NWI would support improved Indigenous access to water, 
there is no legal grounding for this to occur. The movement to greater Indigenous access 
to water has been slow acting and has not met the expectations set out in reform (NWC 
2009). Durette argues that it is “…unlikely that new water policies, especially those 
relying on market mechanisms, will result in an equitable allocation that reflects the 
interests and values of Indigenous Australians in water” (Durette 2008: viii). Ignoring 
Indigenous interests reinforces inequities and is inconsistent with broader policies to 
‘Close the Gap’ (Nikolakis, 2011).  
 
In some cases Indigenous social and economic interests to water have been recognised. 
The Cape York Peninsula Heritage Act (2005) provides for an Indigenous reserve for 
social and economic purposes. As well, in the Northern Territory an Indigenous reserve 
for economic purposes was earmarked in the Tindall Water Allocation Plan. This 
approach is supported by Craig (2007) who believes water markets should have a 
restorative element—such an approach can support ideals of social justice and equity. 
Water for economic purposes is an important objective for Indigenous interests across the 
north, and groups have been publicly advocating for the realisation of this objective (see 
the NAIEWFF, the Mary River Statement, 2009). Taylor et al (2010) argue that 
addressing Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage will require more than rolling out a 
northern development paradigm- but requires policy makers to support social, ecological 
and economic factors that are important to Indigenous people’s wellbeing in the region. 
Water is obviously central to this.  
 
Relying on markets to address equity issues can be fraught with difficulties. Bjornlund 
and McKay (2002) argue that water markets are prone to failure and require adequate 
regulation and robust institutions to influence behaviour. Third party impacts and social 
impacts from the development of markets have received some coverage in scholarly 
literature. However, much of the analysis has been conducted by government authorities, 
particularly in the context of the Murray Darling Basin. The National Water Commission 
(NWC 2010 a) examined the social impacts of water trading. The study found that social 
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 impacts cannot be attributed to water trading alone, any social impacts in rural 
communities must be considered in light of broader economic, technological and social 
trends. A key finding is that trading is providing a mechanism to optimise economic, 
social and ecological values to water, and that markets have provided flexibility to 
irrigators which has been critical in drought (NWC, 2010 a). Such work reveals impacts 
from markets that are both temporal and spatial, which imposes conditions on 
assessments. 
 
In northern Australia, markets are at a formative stage (two decades behind southern 
Australia) but there has been some work into assessing equity issues. Straton et al (2009) 
in a study of irrigators in the Northern Territory found there were concerns around the 
monopolisation of water resources in transition to markets, with a subsequent decline in 
communities. Irrigators in the study wanted constraints on the speculation of water. 
Irrigators viewed markets with suspicion and did not believe markets could help achieve 
environmental outcomes.  
 
Our earlier work (Nikolakis et al., 2010) identifies a number of equity related issues to 
the development of water markets.  These are:  
 
• Nearly half (48%) of all respondents felt that current water 
management arrangements were not equitable. We define 
equitable as all parties being treated equally and fairly under 
the water management regime. Indigenous respondents were 
more likely to disagree than non indigenous respondents that 
water management is equitable in their region (67% compared 
to 40%).  
• Another question put to respondents from government and 
Indigenous groups is whether the interests of Indigenous 
communities in the region are reflected in water management 
policies. Seventy three percent of Indigenous respondents 
disagreed (of these 29% strongly disagreed).  
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 • Most respondents felt that water policy and consultation 
mechanisms failed to involve Indigenous people adequately, 
this was particularly so with Indigenous respondents. 
• It is clear from our findings that Indigenous respondents 
thought the status quo for water management was not 
equitable.  
• Just over half of Indigenous respondents thought water markets 
would be useful in their region 
• There is support for Indigenous involvement in water markets 
among all stakeholders who responded 
• Over half of all respondents felt that the benefits of trading 
would be significant for Indigenous communities. Among 
Indigenous respondents over two thirds felt that the benefits of 
water trading would be significant.   
• Indigenous groups had aspirations to use water for 
development. Eighty seven per cent of Indigenous respondents 
agreed that their community will develop a water based 
enterprise (such as a market garden or horticulture enterprise).  
 
Our findings highlight from our earlier work that almost half of all respondents thought 
the status quo to be inequitable. This was even more so among Indigenous groups who 
overwhelmingly believed water management to not be equitable. Water markets, if they 
included Indigenous interests were seen as having the potential to provide substantial 
benefits to communities and encourage enterprise development.  
 
4.6 Administrative and transaction costs 
 
Transactions costs are the costs of enforcing and exchanging property rights. These costs 
would include, but not limited to, title searches, trade approvals, negotiating and 
enforcing contracts, as well as time, phone calls and travel required to complete a 
 32
 transaction (Livingston, 1995). Stavins (1995) identifies transactions costs in a market as 
the difference between the buying and selling price of the commodity. Some transaction 
costs are necessary to promote certain market behaviour and prevent market failures, 
including trade approval processes, but the objective should be to minimise transaction 
costs (ACCC, 2008). Low transactions costs are seen as a precondition for an effective 
market Grafton et al. 2009). It is suggested that progress on NWI market-led reform is 
slower because of “transaction costs inhibiting the implementation of innovation” (Martin 
et al., 2008: iv).   
 
The NWI is a significant reform and its focus on markets is innovative. But a criticism 
levelled at the NWI is that it is complex and does not provide sufficient guidance on how 
trade should proceed. Connell et al. (2005) argue that the complexity of the NWI fosters 
uncertainty and renders any institutional reforms open to “litigation by aggrieved third 
parties who will have enhanced standing under the NWI” (Connell et al., 2005: 94). 
Without a clear process for dispute resolution this could impose constraints on trading. 
The authors also argue that the NWI does not appropriately support coordination and 
compatibility in trading regimes between the states, this limits the potential for increased 
inter-state trading (this point is identified by the fact inter-state trade has been restricted 
as has trading water outside of districts NWC 2009). These four institutional 
impediments identified by (Martin et al., 2008) are said to generate high transaction cots 
for water markets: 
(1) complexity in institutional and regulatory framework 
(2) political and administrative instruments 
(3) Processes in obtaining licenses or amendments to planning and 
administrative arrangements 
(4) Conflict and lack of effective coordinating mechanisms  
 
McCann and Easter (2004) provide a typology of transaction costs as they relate to water 
markets, as well as the chief determinants of higher transaction costs: 
• Research and information: uncertainty around resource and third party 
impacts 
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 • Enactment or litigation (initial transaction): third party impacts, lack of 
clear right, weak rule of law and low social capital 
• Design and implementation: cross sector transfers, poor infrastructure, 
complex legal arrangements 
• Support and administration 
• Contracting (second order transactions): weak rule of law, low social 
capital, lack of storage capacity, no water registry 
• Monitoring and detection: low social capital, poor monitoring 
equipment, distance, disagreement on water rights 
• Prosecution/enforcement: poor conflict resolution, weak governance, 
hydrological uncertainty. 
 
There are ways to reduce transaction costs. An accurate water entitlement register can 
provide a record of transfers and ownership, supporting property rights and providing 
information to buyers and sellers (ACCC, 2008). A National Water Marketing System 
(NWMS) sought to create standardised registers in each jurisdiction that will provide 
inter-operability between registers in different jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction in northern 
Australia has a functioning register for entitlements and is party to the NWMS.   
 
Markets may cope with predictable and proportionate costs and delays. Allocations or 
short term trades may be impacted most by high transaction costs. In each jurisdiction 
across northern Australia, trades are to be approved by the relevant Department official 
(such as the Water Controller in the NT) or the Ord Irrigation Cooperative. Given the 
small size of markets this requirement may not impose significant transaction costs. But 
the small scale of markets means administrative costs may be proportionally higher. At 
this stage there have been no trades to approve so there is little practical insight into this 
issue.  
 
In northern Australia, Altman with Branchut (2008) argue that water trading regimes 
should recognise and accommodate Indigenous interests. They argue that there could be 
challenges to transfers that interfere with Indigenous rights, particularly under the Native 
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 Title Act where Indigenous rights and interests to water have not received a great deal of 
attention. The result of claims and litigation could mean an increase in transaction costs 
in water markets. Such a situation can be avoided by recognising and accommodating 
Indigenous interests in the consumptive and non consumptive pool (such as through the 
recognition of cultural water).  
 
4.7 Potential environmental consequences of water markets across 
the north 
 
Institutions should be responsible for managing market failure, such as externalities on 
the environment from water trading. Management efforts to offset salinity levels 
associated with water trading in southern Australia have proven to be effective (NWC 
2010b). Managing for impacts from trade on north Australia’s aquatic systems is 
important. Public awareness of the value of tropical rivers is increasing: there is an 
emerging recognition in society that healthy free flowing rivers are vital to “human 
wellbeing and cultural identity” (Jackson et al, 2008: 275). This point was confirmed in 
earlier work where there was overwhelming support among all respondents (81% 
agreeing) for the preservation of certain catchments and aquifers for their unique values 
(Nikolakis et al., 2010) (see Figure 3). The rivers and wetlands across northern Australia 
have international recognition for their unique cultural and ecological values. McJannet et 
al (2009) identify that there are 87 important wetlands in the region, with 8 RAMSAR 
listed sites in the Timor Sea drainage division alone.  
 
Across the region there is little understanding on ground and surface water connection, 
and the link between environmental flows and ecological assets (and groundwater 
dependent ecosystems) also requires much deeper exploration. McJannet et al (2009) 
argue that their work across the north indicates that even minor changes in the flow 
regime will affect water quality, sediment and nutrient loads in systems, with 
consequences for environmental assets. Brodie and Mitchell (2005) highlight that 
extreme nutrient loads and sediments due to agriculture in Australia’s tropical rivers 
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 (where flow is seasonal and episodic) has caused some rivers to become eutrophic. The 
authors suggest improved management to avoid this. In the regulated Ord Irrigation 
district the dry season flows are elevated to dilute and disperse nutrients from irrigation 
activity (Doupe and Pettit 2002). Increased pressure for irrigation development and 
climate change place a level of urgency on research to understand flow thresholds and 
connectivity, and to test these against a variety of scenarios (Hamilton and Gehrke 2005). 
 
Figure 3: Respondents from Nikolakis et al (2010) who agreed that certain catchments 
and aquifers should be preserved 
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Davidson (1969) describes that development in northern Australia has been hindered by 
poor soils, unreliable water supplies and remoteness from markets. However, Hart (2004) 
predicts that any future agricultural expansion in Australia must be in northern Australia 
because of water and land availability (as opposed to the scarcity problem in southern 
Australia).  The storage and consumptive use of water and the pursuit of economic 
efficiency and maximising economic returns in irrigated agriculture is often at odds with 
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 the ecological integrity of riverine systems (Tisdell, 2010).  Hart (2004) proposes a 
measured approach to increased irrigation in the north using best available science 
(especially scenario planning) and decisions based on precautionary principles. Such an 
approach can mitigate ecological risk from inappropriate irrigation practices, especially 
for aquatic ecosystems. Limitations on trade to catchments or aquifers (or plan areas 
which is the case in each jurisdiction) can help reduce the effect of moving water around 
and jurisdictions have imposed restrictions on trade, such as in the NT there are 
constraints on upstream trade.   
 
Petheram et al (2008b) assessed 99 unregulated rivers across northern Australia for their 
potential for development. While streamflow is comparatively high, their study recorded 
significant annual variability and drought magnitude relative to other systems around the 
world. This means irrigation in the north would require storages (where groundwater is 
not sufficient). The potential for storages is highly constrained, and on farm storages are 
hindered by environmental flow regulations that limit extraction to certain times of the 
year.  Despite northern Australia producing 64% of the nation’s runoff, it can generate 
only 45% of Australia’s potentially exploitable yield- because of high evapo-
transpiration, restrictions on water storage and episodic stream flow (Petheram et al, 
2010).  In contrast to Hart (2004), Petheram et al (2010) suggest maintaining the focus on 
southern Australia to sustain Australia’s irrigation potential.  
 
Petheram et al (2008b) point out that because of high evaporation in the north, irrigation 
during the dry is essential. High evaporation rates mean perennial pasture requires up to 
80% more water than in the MDB. Petheram et al (2008b) discern that 40% of Australia’s 
potentially exploitable water is located in northern Australia, and that if all of this was 
used up to 25% of Australia’s irrigation area could theoretically be in northern Australia. 
However, the authors impose social, customary and ecological caveats, which would 
reduce this area considerably. There is a reliance in much of northern Australia on 
groundwater, but aquifers are not well understood (recharge, discharge and lateral 
groundwater flow) (Petheram et al., 2008c). The impacts of extraction could potentially 
have significant downstream consequences on groundwater dependent ecosystems and 
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 Indigenous communities (Straton et al, 2009).  Another key issue in the north is that the 
mining and resources sector, which is a significant part of the economy (some $9.1 
billion), is not subject to water licenses and not counted within caps in plans. This makes 
accounting for water difficult and increases the complexity of planning (NAWLT, 2009).  
 
In parts of tropical Queensland, salinity has been a problem associated with irrigation 
which requires appropriate regulation to manage (see Lower Burderkin in Petheram et al., 
2008a). The interaction of aquatic species such as fish with increased extraction is of 
utmost importance to Indigenous and non Indigenous Australians (with commercial 
fishing worth around $160 million per annum). Floods are vital to productivity of marine 
species such as prawns and crabs, and unimpeded streamflow is vital for fish migration 
and breeding (NAWLT, 2009). There has been modeling to understand the effect of 
increased extraction on systems in the north. Chan et al (in press) examined extraction 
scenarios on dry season flows and the consequences for important native fish species in 
the Daly River, in the NT. They found that if all entitlements were fully utilized in the 
Daly during the dry season that Barramundi and Sooty Grunter numbers would be 
reduced to unacceptable levels. These fish species are important to Indigenous and 
recreational fishers, and the Barramundi is an important commercial fishery. The effect 
on ecosystems and livelihoods could be significant if such conditions are realized.  
 
Approaches to deciding the amount of water for the environment 
 
The NWI sets out an approach to managing water which balances economic, social and 
ecological interests (see paragraph 2, NWI, 2004).  A statutory water plan is recommend 
to allocate water between economic, social and ecological interests, and the NWI 
provides that trade-offs between these interests should be decided by best available 
science, socio-economic analysis and community input (see para. 36, NWI, 2004). Water 
plans are intended to secure ecological outcomes by identifying ecological assets and the 
water management arrangements to support these assets (see para. 37 NWI, 2004). 
Tomlinson and Davis (2010) suggest that despite national reforms set out in the NWI to 
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 achieve environmental outcomes in water planning, progress has been slow to date by 
states and territories and aquatic ecosystems remain under threat.  
 
Water plans under the NWI are to be adaptive (par. 25, NWI, 2004) and recognize 
connectivity between surface and groundwater (par. 23 (x) NWI, 2004). The ambition of 
the NWI is to achieve sustainable extraction. But identifying a sustainable yield is 
complex. There are data issues around how much water is available at both temporal and 
spatial scales. Particularly across northern Australia where data on stream flow or aquifer 
recharge is often non existent or scant at best (NAWLT, 2009). Then deciding tradeoffs 
between consumptive and non consumptive uses represents significant challenges, where 
many non consumptive uses are not well understood (such as ecological thresholds and 
water for spiritual purposes).  
Table 5: Examining environmental regulations related to trade in the region (drawn from 
NWC 2010b) 
 
Jurisdiction Approach to environmental water 
NT Generic approach of 80-95% of water resources allocated to the environment  
 
80-20 rule is in effect in groundwater and surface water systems. 80% of annual 
recharge and stream flow must be left for the environment.  
QLD Section 46 (4b) of the Water Act 2000 (QLD) sets out environmental flow targets 
(thresholds met before allocations are made)  
 
Water Resource Plans sets out ecological and social objectives monitored and 
revisited every 10 years in surface flow areas.  
 
In Queensland the environmental objectives for groundwater have not been 
decided, while for surface flow an independent scientific panel determines the 
amount of water for the environment.  
 
WA Ecological water requirements are set out in Statewide Policy No. 5 
Environmental Water Provisions Policy for Western Australia.  
 
The NWC (2010) identifies that groundwater scientific assessment is based on 
the size of aquifer, connectivity and ecological values; while determining 
environmental water requirements for surface water there are three methods used: 
1. Flow events method: applies ecological values, hydrologic analysis and 
hydraulic modelling.  
2. Building block approach: identify a flow regime that supports a healthy  
system 
3. Wetted perimeter method: relationship between discharge and wetter 
perimeter (perimeter of the cross sectional area that is wet) 
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4.8 Political feasibility and likely adoption rates 
 
The political feasibility of water markets has been explored in our earlier work (see 
Nikolakis and Grafton 2009; Nikolakis et al., 2010). In our second report, we found that 
half of respondents in our study (n=120) agreed that water markets would be useful in 
their region. Some 55% of Indigenous respondents agreed that water markets would be 
useful. This suggests some acceptance of markets among respondents. In the same study, 
this support for markets was qualified in open ended responses, with forty seven 
respondents (of 120) suggesting that community opposition is the major obstacle to the 
feasibility and viability of water markets (Nikolakis et al., 2010). There were concerns 
around water being privatised and monopolised, as one respondent elaborates:  
 
“The general community is fundamentally opposed to water markets as 
they view the resource as a community resource to be shared and not one 
which should be commodified, bought and sold by those with access and 
the means to do so.”  
 
These concerns were also identified in work by Straton et al (2009) in Katherine (NT) 
where horticulturists had negative perceptions of water markets. There were concerns that 
water would be monopolised by dominant interests and speculated with. As well, 
horticulturists were concerned about the applicability of a system from southern Australia 
to a north Australian context.  At the same time the horticulturists were in favour of more 
secure entitlements, more efficient administrative processes and a better scientific 
understanding of water resources which could inform planning. This suggests that there 
are elements of water markets that may be acceptable to horticulturists (such as a secure 
property right in the context of a water plan informed by best available science and 
consultation). The stigma of markets appears to be an issue that stirs concern.  
 
In our second report it was raised by respondents that community opposition is linked to 
a lack of awareness. Some respondents offered that government would need to address 
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 this with education and awareness programs to build broader support for water markets. 
Those respondents that showed support for water markets tended to be older respondents, 
with a higher education; and these respondents considered themselves to have a high 
level of understanding of water management. Indigenous respondents were also more 
likely to support water markets. However, while over half of all respondents agreed that 
water should be a tradable commodity, only 34% of Indigenous respondents agreed that 
water should be a tradable commodity. Indigenous respondents were also more likely to 
disagree that land and water title should not be separated (Nikolakis et al., 2010). This 
reflects holistic Indigenous world views of water as being inseparable from land 
(Jackson, 2005). The support for markets reflects an emergence of Indigenous economic 
aspirations which as Jackson and Morrison (2007) describe sit side by side customary 
aspirations.  
 
These findings suggest that in-principle there is a small consensus in support of water 
markets. But this agreement is couched in values such as environmental protection and 
equity. The work highlights the growing importance of economic development to 
Indigenous people in the region to address Indigenous disadvantage. Water is seen as one 
opportunity to support economic outcomes, but there are caveats to how this development 
is to occur- with opposition to separating land and water title, treating water as a 
commodity. 
 
4.9 Social justice issues relating to Indigenous (non-market) 
livelihoods 
 
The expansion of water trading is likely to have implications for Indigenous livelihoods 
which are often focused on aquatic resources across the north. The experience for 
Indigenous people with irrigation in northern Australia has not always been constructive. 
The Ord Irrigation scheme in northern Australia developed in the 1950’s had a significant 
effect on the Miriwung Gajerrong peoples who are displaced by the dam from their 
homelands (Barber and Rumley, 2003). Indigenous values to water are diverse across the 
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 north, with water integral for customary, spiritual, social, economic and recreational 
aspirations. Water is also central to Indigenous mythology and Indigenous worldviews 
conceive of water, land, sea and all living creatures as one living entity (Armstrong, 
2008; Toussaint et al., 2005). Indigenous values are subjective and intangible, distinct 
from western perspectives (Jackson, 2005). The rivers and wetlands across the north have 
significant amenity values to local people, and the cultural values attached are highly 
valued even by urban Australians (Zander et al., 2010).   
 
In response to a potential increase in agricultural expansion in northern Australia, 
Indigenous groups across northern Australia came together and prepared the Mary River 
Statement. This statement calls for a collaborative approach between Indigenous peoples 
in northern Australia and Governments to develop “[an Indigenous] water entitlement 
and allocation… to satisfy our (i) social and cultural (ii) ecological; and (iii) economic 
needs” (NAIEWFF, 2009). If water is increasingly treated as an economic good to be 
bought and sold there is the potential for impacts on Indigenous livelihoods. Our previous 
work highlighted that water which would have previously been left in the environment 
may likely be used if the water has a price, as incentive emerges to use or sell water 
(Nikolakis et al., 2010). Sleeper entitlements or licenses may be activated, which means 
more water being applied on farm, with less left in rivers or aquifers. The potential 
customary impacts are highly interdependent with environmental consequences given the 
reliance of the customary economy on healthy ecosystems. As well, cultural sites like 
jilas or springs may be affected by more extraction, with consequences on people’s 
stories and cultural obligations (the importance of these cultural sites are discussed in 
Cooper and Jackson 2008; and Toussaint et al. 2005).  
 
There are fears that as markets develop, Indigenous people will be alienated from water 
resources (Armstrong, 2008). Altman (2004) argues that Indigenous customary values 
must be recognised and integrated into water markets.  If not, the author suggests that 
legal challenges may impose significant transaction costs on water markets. Some aspects 
of reform go directly against Indigenous world views. The separation of land and water 
title for example runs counter to the holistic perspective of Indigenous Australians 
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 (Altman with Branchut, 2008).  McLean (2007) focuses on approaches which incorporate 
principles of justice in water management. The author suggests that a cultural flow which 
includes water for customary, domestic and economic purposes could remedy past 
injustices and support equitable outcomes. A cultural flow is a concept that finds its 
origin in southern Australia, and highlights that Indigenous customary aspirations related 
to water are distinct from the environment. It also highlights that management of water is 
an objective for Indigenous Australians, not only to protect culture, ecological and 
hydrological integrity, but also to deliver economic outcomes.  
 
5. Alternate non-market approaches to meeting north Australia’s 
water allocation needs 
 
This section explores whether there may be alternatives to a market based approach to 
water allocation in northern Australia. Markets are at one extreme of decentralized 
control while ‘command and control’ approaches are at the other. Command and control 
is characterised by centralised decision making. Markets are characterised as being best 
suited to allocating scarce water resources; allowing individuals to adjust quickly to 
changing water availability (Grafton et al., 2009).  While the pre-conditions for a water 
market may not exist across much of the north (i.e. scarcity and sufficient demand), a 
market may work in combination to support other approaches to manage resources 
sustainably. Alternatives which could work in combination with markets include nested 
governance, as well as a collaborative and stakeholder focused approach. Grafton et al. 
(2009) reflect that holistic approaches to water resources create institutions that reflect 
diversity and local conditions, and the optimal blend of policy instruments is dependent 
on local conditions and objectives for the specific area.  
 
Despite a focus on markets in the NWI, there are limitations in relying on markets to 
govern resource allocation. Bell and Quiggin (2008) canvass the argument that market 
based instruments are limited by transactions costs, and uncertainty, and that pricing and 
trading may not effectively support environmental objectives (and may even encourage 
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 increased water use through the activation of dormant entitlements). The authors suggest 
increased public involvement and meta-governance, where markets are treated as an 
“active public-private partnership” (Bell and Quggin, 2008: 726). This meta-governance 
model would see the state as central to setting objectives, managing risk, providing 
information and supporting governance arrangements- effectively managing the 
governance of markets as opposed to devolving control to market based instruments. This 
view sees a supporting role for government to manage the externalities from market 
failure.  
 
Effective institutions to managing water limit the costs of managing the resource; makes 
decisions aligned with social and political values;  the institutions decisions are viewed as 
legitimate on collective decisions; they manage the resource sustainably for future 
generations; and they create stability to encourage long term private sector investment 
(Reeve, 2003). Agarwal (2002) proposes a management framework for common pool 
resources (building on various institutional frameworks). The framework includes: 
institutional arrangements with local rules, enforcement and monitoring; sustainable 
management, where extraction is linked to recharge (in the case of groundwater); and the 
external environment, where the role of forces such as the state, technology and markets 
should be carefully managed, a supportive approach to local users producing 
conservation outcomes and a nested approach to governance.  
Nested approaches to governance recognise the interdependencies between different 
water users, including both consumptive and non consumptive users in decision making. 
A nested approach establishes more formal arrangements between these stakeholder 
groups to make binding rules about use of the resource, monitoring compliance and 
enforcing rules (Marshall, 2008; Ostrom 1990).  Nested approaches are polycentric, and 
efforts between different interests are coordinated in partnership with government 
(Marshall, 2008). In a study with irrigator in Katherine in the NT, Straton et al (2009) 
found that informal norms and values (i.e. social connections) have an important effect 
on market institutions, particularly for common pool resources like ‘groundwater’.  The 
authors call for increased participation of communities in water resource management 
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 and planning as they found norms and values provide important checks and balances on 
water users. Such an approach can augment regulation, and enforcement and compliance 
procedures.  It is argued that such a participatory approach improves the information 
available to users which can help minimise information asymmetry. Information 
asymmetry provides a barrier to efficient trading and increases transaction costs (Straton 
et al., 2009). There are many benefits to these cooperative or nested approaches, but there 
is also the potential for high transactions costs and accountability issues remain - there is 
the potential for certain interests to dominate (Huitema et al., 2009). It is important to get 
governance right in these models, and if consensus is required then there may be delays 
or inaction- so dispute resolution mechanisms are important. It would be important to 
ensure capacity building efforts encourage Indigenous participation in collaborative or 
nested approaches.  
An approach to consider in northern Australia is a local and stakeholder governance 
engagement approach. The trend in water management is for a more collaborative and 
stakeholder focused approach, given the potential for political controversy and litigation 
associated with water resources policy (Loux, 2011). In New Zealand the Canterbury 
region has pursued a collaborative approach which encourages robust public engagement 
with a broad cross section of stakeholders, collaboration is genuine (with equity and 
fairness at its core) and consensus is sought in deciding water allocation and management 
(Memon and Weber, 2008). Such an approach seeks to encourage community ownership 
in resource decisions and to support compliance, particularly on issues such as water 
quality and efficiency.4 The authors identify seven principles to successful collaboration 
by providing participants with a genuine stake in outcomes (sourced from Memon and 
Weber, 2008): 
 
• Inclusiveness: involving all stakeholders increases legitimacy, enhances problem 
solving and supports policy implementation. 
• Formal binding collective choice rules with a purpose: promoting fairness, equity 
and collective gains. Decisions developed collaboratively should be binding and -
                                                 
4 Loux (2011) identifies collaboration as a structured approach to meeting water resource challenges, and 
developing policies and plans.  
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 with all participants having a veto power. This encourages collaboration and 
stakeholder ‘buy in’. 
• Ongoing or repeat games: the collaborative is rooted in an ongoing process, so it 
is helpful for stakeholders to be ongoing entities who interact regularly with other 
stakeholder and have a vested interest in long term outcomes.  
• Participant norms: the collaborations are aligned with norms and these norms are 
enforced when there is a breach of compliance (norms include integrity and 
honesty).  
• The Leadership Element: collaborative capacity builders. A distinctive style of 
leadership is necessary for successful collaborative governance. The approach 
tends to be persuasive and inclusive, and is attentive to the needs of all 
stakeholders.  
• Credible commitment: involves a consistent and genuine commitment to the 
process over the long term. Such a commitment builds trust and legitimacy.  
• Technical expertise and beyond: Integrating and applying a broad knowledge 
base: local and multi-disciplinary knowledge, as well as technical expertise 
combine to be important to collaborative processes. Integrating and distributing 
this knowledge among stakeholders is a useful function of collaborations.  
 
Learning from the efforts in Canterbury there are barriers to the effectiveness of a 
collaborative approach to water management and allocation (drawn from Memon and 
Weber, 2008). First there may be little incentive for stakeholders to cooperate (some 
stakeholders may not identify water as scarce); second the efficacy of such an approach is 
dependent on trust and social capital; stakeholders do not have scientific capacity to 
participate as ‘equal’ partners to a collaborative approach; collaborative approaches are 
highly dependent on leadership, and such qualities are uncommon; and there is enormous 
uncertainty and complexity around Maori customary water rights (Memon and Weber, 
2008). How such uncertainty affects collaborations in New Zealand works in two ways: 
first non Indigenous stakeholders are reluctant to engage with Maori because of 
unresolved rights and title; and second the uncertainty makes water resources planning 
and management complex (Memon and Weber, 2008). This latter issue, around 
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 customary water rights, remains a key issue across northern Australia (see Altman with 
Branchut, 2008 for further discussion). But it is identified as important to resolve the 
issue of Indigenous rights and title to water through recognition of these rights and 
interests- and engaging Indigenous groups in collaborative processes is important for 
‘inclusivity’.  
 
For Indigenous groups, ownership of resources like water is often viewed communally. 
Integrating this worldview with individual property rights regimes can be complex and 
lead to inequities (see Trawick, 2003). Trawick (2003) proposes in the Andes that 
approaches to water allocations should reflect community values and interests, in this 
case he suggests a communal system of ownership that reflects traditions and self 
management- emphasising that approaches should be local in nature and affirmed by the 
people whose livelihood is at stake. Trawick (2003) confirms the work of Ostrom (1990) 
that rules for governing common property are only effective if they are specified by the 
users themselves. For Indigenous groups across northern Australia, the lessons from 
Trawick suggest an integration of Indigenous values in collaborative governance efforts- 
at the same time capacity building should be an inherent part of these collaborations. 
Capacity building includes training and education outcomes on water resource 
management, which can lead to increased knowledge dispersal and potentially changes in 
water management (Leendertse and Taylor, 2011).  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
This study highlights that water markets are at a formative stage across northern 
Australia. In southern Australia water markets have been effective in providing flexibility 
to irrigators and supporting productivity through reallocation during drought. But there 
are preconditions for a water market to be effective. Important is for there to be scarcity, 
competition for water and low to medium transactions costs. The potential for high and 
increased transactions costs is significant across northern Australia. There remains 
uncertainty over the resource and around Indigenous customary rights to water. This 
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 suggests that there must be greater certainty around Indigenous involvement in water 
markets to minimise the potential for increased transaction costs.   
 
There are environmental costs associated with water markets. These impacts include 
increased water use (from the activation of sleeper and dozer entitlements), higher levels 
of salinity, and consequences from moving water from one area to another. There is the 
potential in northern Australia for environmental impacts from trade. Increased salinity 
in-stream; water logging from more on-farm use; saltwater intrusion because of reduced 
flows; and during the dry increased nutrient loads could threaten the health of rivers. 
These issues can be addressed through management efforts.  
 
Efficiency is key aim of water markets. Economic efficiency arises when all the gains 
from trade have been exhausted and the costs imposed on others from water use have 
been fully accounted for in the decision making of water users. Any assessment of 
efficiency of water markets in the north must seek to integrate customary or ecological 
values, but it is acknowledged that this is complex as these values are intangible and 
difficult to quantify.  
 
Issues of equity are important in the transition to water access rights. In the north, the 
movement to water markets will require considerable Indigenous involvement to ensure 
principles of equity are upheld. Water trading should be guided by rules that protect 
Indigenous customary values and interests. Importantly, there will need to be 
consideration of surface and groundwater connectivity, and the effect of extraction on 
groundwater dependent ecosystems, which are of high importance to Indigenous people 
in the region.   
 
Political opposition to water markets is an important consideration. There was slender 
support for water markets. Support for water markets was found to be strongest among 
Indigenous respondents. But it was emphasised that there should be important conditions 
on how markets should operate in the north, including the protection of ecological assets 
 48
 and customary values. Greater community awareness on the purpose of water markets is 
important, to building understanding and support.  
 
Non market approaches to allocation may be more suitable than market based approaches 
across the north.  Determining which approach is most appropriate will be dependent on 
local conditions. A blend of approaches to allocating water may be more suitable. 
Markets combined with collaborative governance may support the achievement of 
ecological and equity outcomes. Collaborative approaches provide a formal structure for 
stakeholders to develop rules over allocation and management of water, as well rules for 
enforcement and compliance. Straton et al. (2009) suggested that such an approach is 
important in Katherine in the NT to encourage sustainable use of groundwater resources. 
It is important to foster inclusivity in collaborative approaches, and uncertainty over 
customary rights can be a significant constraint to the efficacy of a collaborative 
approach. Resolving uncertainty for Indigenous rights to water could occur through the 
creation of a property right specific to Indigenous interests.  
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